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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
The Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(j)(1990). PlaintiffAppellant, Covecrest Properties ("Covecrest") appeals a final
Order. Ruling and Judgment, issued by the Third Judicial
District Court in favor of Defendant, City of West Jordan.
Judgment was entered on March 8, 1990, and
Plaintiffs-Appellants filed their Notice of Appeal on April
3, 1990.
INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE
Pursuant to Rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, Covecrest hereby adopts and incorporates by this
reference, the Brief filed by the other Appellants, in
support of this appeal.

In addition, Covecrest respectfully

files this separate brief to more fully develop the following
determinative issues.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The determinative issues for this Court's review are
as follows:

I
WERE SUBDIVIDERS REQUIRED TO FILE A NOTICE OF
CLAIM UNDER UTAH'S GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT,
BEFORE THEY FILED A LAWSUIT AGAINST THE CITY
TO RECOVER IMPACT FEES COLLECTED UNDER AN
ORDINANCE DETERMINED TO BE VOID AB INITIO?
IF NOTICE WAS REQUIRED, WAS IT SATISFIED BY
NOTICE SENT ON BEHALF OF ALL SUBDIVIDERS
SIMILARLY SITUATED, AND/OR BY THE
COMMENCEMENT OF A LAWSUIT CHALLENGING THE
VALIDITY OF THE ORDINANCE?

1

II
WHAT IS THE APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
FOR COMMENCING AN ACTION TO RECOVER IMPACT
FEES COLLECTED AND RETAINED BY THE CITY
THROUGH MISTAKE OR WITHOUT AUTHORITY?

Ill
WHEN DID THE SUBDIVIDERS• CAUSES OF ACTION
ACCRUE AND DID THEY FILE TIMELY? IF NOT, WAS
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS TOLLED?

IV
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DENYING THE
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO STRIKE THE CITY'S
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES OF MISTAKE, ESTOPPEL,
WAIVER, LACHES, AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT, WHICH,
ARE NOT AVAILABLE TO A MUNICIPALITY THAT
COLLECTS AND RETAINS MONEY WITHOUT AUTHORITY,
AND/OR BECAUSE THE CLAIMED DEFENSES WERE
WITHOUT FACTUAL BASIS?
Standard of Review:

The Court should review the

facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the
subdividers, and may freely reappraise the trial court's
legal conclusions.

Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Nat. Bank. 737 P.2d

225, 229 (Utah 1987).
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF UTAH CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES
Reproduced in Addendum:
Utah Code Ann.

§63-30-11 (1990).

Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25 (1989).
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-36 (1990).
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This lawsuit involves consolidated actions to recover
impact fees paid to the City of West Jordan pursuant to an
2

ordinance determined by the Utah Supreme Court to be void ab
initio in 1986.
Covecrest Properties, a Utah limited partnership, was
a subdivider.

In January and June 1978, the City of West

Jordan required Covecrest to pay impact fees under Ordinance
No. 33, Section 9-C-8(a).

The Ordinance was being challenged

by other subdividers in the Third Judicial District Court for
the State of Utah, and had been commenced in 1979 as a class
action complaint against the City of West Jordan.
Prior to initiating the suit, written demand on
behalf of named subdividers, and all other subdividers who
were required to pay impact fees under the ordinance, was
made to the City of West Jordan.
While the lawsuit was pending, Covecrest filed for
approval of planned subdivisions, but was required to pay the
impact fee, before the City would approve the subdivision
applications.
In 1986, the Utah Supreme Court determined the impact
fee ordinance to be void ab initio.
P.2d 180 (Utah 1986).

Call v. West Jordan. 727

On November 24, 1987, Covecrest

initiated suit against the City of West Jordan in the Third
Judicial District Court, Case No. C87-7680.

It was

consolidated into this action by order of Judge Brian on
August 26, 1988.
The City moved for partial summary judgment, claiming
that the subdividers1 actions were barred by the applicable
3

statute of limitations.

The subdividers filed a cross-motion

for summary judgment on the statute of limitation issue, and
a separate motion for summary judgment to strike the
affirmative defenses raised by the City.
The trial court granted the Cityfs motion for partial
summary judgment and denied the subdividers1 motions.
The trial court found that the Plaintiffs failed to
file a Notice of Claim within 90 days after their cause of
action arose, and that they failed to initiate their
litigation within one-year after their cause of action arose.
In addition, the court determined that the "Doctrine of
Equitable Tolling" had not been adopted by the State of Utah.
Therefore, the Court concluded that the Plaintiffs1 claims
were barred by the statute of limitation, and because they
failed to comply with the Notice of Claim requirement.

(Ex.

"B", Addendum)
The plaintiff subdividers timely appealed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On January 21, 1975, the City of West Jordan amended
Ordinance No. 33 by adding Section 9-C-8(a) (herein called
the "Ordinance") requiring subdividers to dedicate seven
percent (7%) of land area or equivalent value in cash.

If

the City elected to accept money instead of land, payment was
required on or before the approval of the subdivision plat by
the City Council.

Call v. City of West Jordan, 606 P.2d 217,

218 (Utah 1979).
4

On November 3, 1977, notice of claim and demand for
refund of monies paid under the Ordinance, was sent to the
West Jordan Mayor and City Council.

R. 251-252.

The notice

was sent on behalf of John Call, Clark Jenkins, and "all
other similarly situated" who were required to dedicate land
or to pay cash under the Ordinance.

(Id.)

The City of West Jordan received the notice, and
copies were distributed to the Mayor, members of the City
Council, the City Manager, the City Attorney, and the City
Recorder.

R. 261.

The notice stated that a class action would be
commenced if the City refused to refund the impact fees.
R. 252.
On February 7, 1978, a class action complaint for
declaratory judgment and other relief was filed on behalf of
Call, Jenkins, and "all others similarly situated" against
the City of West Jordan.

The asserted class included "all

persons, partnerships, businesses and corporations which
have, or will be required, to either dedicate . . . land
. . . or the equivalent in cash to the Defendant in
accordance with Ordinance No. 33 of West Jordan, Utah and the
amendment thereto adding Section 9-C-8."

(Complaint, Call

case, supra.)
Covecrest Properties is a Utah limited partnership
whose initial limited partners included minor children who
have not all reached the age of majority.
5

R. 271. Covecrest

developed the West Jordan subdivisions named Vista Via I, II
and III.

R. 272.

In January 1978, $6,714.97 was required to be paid as
an impact fee, pursuant to the Ordinance before the City
would approve development of Vista Via I subdivision.

(Id.)

In June 1978, Covecrest applied to the City of West Jordan
for approvals of contiguous subdivisions called Vista Via II
and III.

Prior to granting its approval, the City required

Covecrest to pay $12,169.25, pursuant to the Ordinance.
(Id.)
In addition to the cash payments, the City required
flood control improvements to be installed at Covecrest's
cost, pursuant to the Ordinance.

These improvements included

storm drains, drain fields, ditches, both onsite and offsite
piping which cost Covecrest in excess of $50,000.

R. 272-

273.
In connection with the Call case, the City
investigated the facts and circumstances involved with the
receipt of impact fees, and the improvements they required to
be made by subdividers, under the Ordinance. R. 276-283.
The Utah Supreme Court determined that West Jordan
Ordinance No. 33, Section 9-C-8, was void ab initio.

Call v.

City of West Jordan. 727 P.2d 180 (Utah 7-23-86, rehearing
denied 10-29-86).

The Court also determined that the trial

court had not abused its discretion in refusing class action
status.

The Court said:
6

We are here dealing with a class whose
members have been identified. They are
developers engaged in business whose claims
are not so insubstantial that joinder or
individual suits would not merit the cost.
It is unlikely that denial of class action
status would preclude them from pursuing
their remedies. . . . Because of our ruling
on the merits of the case, there is no
possibility of inconsistent judgments and no
issue of substantial public interest remains.
Call v. Citv of West Jordan, 727 P.2d 180, 183-184 (Utah
1986).
On November 5, 1987, the Third Judicial District
Court entered its Ruling, Order and Judgment in the Call
case, directing the City of West Jordan to refund the impact
fees, together with interest, to the Plaintiffs in that case,
R. 285.
Within three weeks, on November 24, 1987, Covecrest
filed its lawsuit for refund of the impact fees.

(Ex. "C",

Addendum)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

I
Claims against a City, for refund of money that was
collected and retained by mistake or without authority, are
exempt from the notice requirement contained in Utah's
Governmental Immunity Act.

Even if the Utah Supreme Court

had not previously decided that issue, the City received
adequate notice of the subdividers1 claims in 1977, when
certain subdividers sent notice for themselves and others
similarly situated.

7

In addition, a class action complaint was filed
against the City in 1979.

In connection therewith, the City

researched all facts and circumstances concerning impact fees
charged, received, and used.

The fact that no additional

notice was given, before the appellant-subdividers filed
suit, did not result in any prejudice to the City.
II
The statute of limitation applicable to the
subdividers' action is Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25 (1989),
providing a four year time frame to commence actions on an
implied contract (El Rancho Enterprises. Inc. v. Murray City
Corp., 565 P.2d 778, 779-780 (Utah 1977)), or actions for
relief not otherwise provided for by law.
The subdividers1 cause of action to recover impact
fees paid under an ordinance that was adjudged to be void,
did not accrue before this Court determined the ordinance to
be void ab initio, in 1986.
By filing suit in 1987, subdivider Covecrest
Properties commenced its action timely.
Ill
Should the Court determine that the subdividers1
cause of action accrued prior to 1986, or that a shorter
period of limitation is applicable, then justice and equity
require a finding that the statute was tolled.
There are at least four separate and distinct reasons
for tolling the period of limitation.
8

First, there was a

concurrent appeal of the same or similar matter in the Call
case.

Second, the Call case had been filed as a class action

complaint.

Third, with respect to Covecrest, the statute

should be tolled during the minority of its limited partners.
Fourth, the "Doctrine of Equitable Tolling" should be applied
to promote justice, do equity, and encourage judicial economy
by avoiding duplicitous and unnecessary litigation.

IY
The trial court erred in denying the subdividers1
motion to strike the City's affirmative defenses of mistake,
estoppel, waiver, laches, and unjust enrichment, because they
are unavailable to a municipality that collects and retains
money that is paid under an invalid ordinance.

If such

defenses were available, the City failed to offer or produce
any evidence of their having a factual basis, and the
subdividers were entitled to summary judgment as a matter of
law.
ARGUMENT
I
SUBDIVIDERS WERE NOT REQUIRED TO FILE A
NOTICE OF CLAIM UNDER UTAH'S GOVERNMENTAL
IMMUNITY ACT, BEFORE FILING SUIT AGAINST THE
CITY TO RECOVER IMPACT FEES COLLECTED UNDER
AN ORDINANCE THAT THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
DETERMINED TO BE VOID AB INITIO. IF NOTICE
WAS REQUIRED, IT WAS ADEQUATELY GIVEN AND THE
CITY WAS NOT PREJUDICED.
Covecrest was not required to give notice to the City
of West Jordan before filing this lawsuit.

9

Equitable claims,

and claims for the refund of monies paid to a city under
mistake or without authority of law, are exempt from the
notice requirements of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act,
contained in Utah Code Ann. §63-30-11 (1990) Jenkins v. Swan,
675 P.2d 1145, 1154 (Utah 1983); El Rancho Enterprises v.
Murray Citv Corp. 565 P.2d 778, 780 (Utah 1977).
The Utah Supreme Court has said:
In El Rancho Enterprises, Inc. v. Murray City Corp.,
Utah 565 P.2d 778, 779 (1977), we said that the
"common law exception to governmental immunity
pertaining to equitable claims has long been
recognized in this jurisdiction." We held that
neither the passage of time nor the enactment of the
Governmental Immunity Act has eroded that principal.
Id. at 780. In 1978 the statutory section
authorizing the suit in El Rancho, . . . was repealed
and such claims are now covered exclusively by the
Governmental Immunity Act. . . these amendments to
not undermine the continued viability of our holding
in El Rancho, that equitable claims of this nature
for assessments made "without authority of law," are
exempt from the notice requirements. El Rancho, at
780. Because this holding is predicated on the
common law exception to governmental immunity for
equitable claims, such claims are also exempt from
the undertaking requirements of the Governmental
Immunity Act.
Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1154 (Utah 1983).
Even if the Utah Supreme Court had not previously
decided this issue, and the notice requirement were
determined to be applicable in this case, it was satisfied.
Notice was sent to the Defendant on November 3, 1977.
251-252.

R.

It was received and copies were provided to the

Mayor, City Council, and various public officials.
In addition, notice was given to the Defendant, by

10

R. 261.

commencement of a class action lawsuit, February 7, 1978, on
behalf of all subdividers who paid, or who would have been
required to pay, impact fees pursuant to Ordinance No. 33.
Call v. Citv of West Jordan. 606 P.2d 217 (Utah 1979).
Affirmance of the denial of class action status was in 1986.
Call v. Citv of West Jordan. 727 P.2d 180 (Utah 1985).
The purpose for written notice is to enable the
governmental body to investigate the facts while the evidence
is relatively fresh.

The City received timely notice and had

full opportunity to investigate the facts pertinent to the
present lawsuit.

R.276-283.

No legitimate purpose would

have been served by Covecrest sending an additional notice of
claim, and the City was not prejudiced.

The City was not

prejudiced because Covecrest did not file an additional
notice of claim.
Another reason why the notice requirement of the Act
should not bar Covecrest's claim, is because the limited
partners have always included the same minor children.

R.

271. The Utah Supreme Court has held that time limitations
are tolled during minority, and this also applies to the
notice requirements of the Act.

The Court has said:

. . .[A] minor claimant is justly entitled to the
protection afforded by said section 78-12-36(1)
U.C.A. 1953f in all cases, including notice
requirements of the type contained in the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act. To hold otherwise is a
denial of due process and equal protection.

11

Scott v. School Bd. of Granite Sch. Dist.. 568 P.2d 746, 748
(Utah 1977).

II
THE APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATION ALLOWS
FOUR YEARS IN WHICH TO COMMENCE AN ACTION TO
RECOVER IMPACT FEES COLLECTED AND RETAINED BY
THE CITY THROUGH MISTAKE OR WITHOUT
AUTHORITY. UTAH CODE ANN, §78-12-25 (1989).
THE SUBDIVIDERS1 CAUSE OF ACTION DID NOT
ACCRUE UNTIL THE COURT DETERMINED THE IMPACT
FEE ORDINANCE TO BE VOID AB INITIO IN 1986,
AND COVECREST COMMENCED ITS SUIT TIMELY IN
1987.
This lawsuit is not a challenge to the validity of
the subject Ordinance.

That issue was decided in 1986.

Call

v. City of West Jordan. 727 P.2d 180 (Utah 1986).
This lawsuit is an action to recover fees that the
City required of the subdividers, without authority.

This

Court has determined that actions to recover money received
by a municipality by mistake or without authority of law, are
subject to Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25 (1989).

That Statute

requires actions upon a contract not in writing or for
actions not otherwise provided for by law, to be commenced
within four years.

Ponderosa One v. Salt Lake City Sub. San.

P., 738 P.2d 635 (Utah, 1987); El Rancho Enterprises v.
Murray Citv Corp.. 565 P.2d 778 (Utah 1977).

The Court has

said:
If the City obtained the money of another by mistake,
or without authority of law, it is her duty to refund
it—not from any contract entered into by her on the
subject, but from the general obligation to do
justice which binds all persons, whether natural or
artificial. If the City obtain other property which
does not belong to her, it is her duty to restore it;
12

or if used by her, to render an equivalent to the
true owner from the like general obligation. In
these cases she does not, in fact, make any promise
on the subject but the law, which always intends
justice, implies one; and her liability thus arising
is said to be a liability on an implied contract.
El Rancho Enterprises, Inc. v. Murray Citv Corp. 565 P.2d
778, 779-780 (Utah 1977).
The four-year period of limitation began to run
either in July 1986, when the Ordinance was held to be void
ab initio, or in October 1986 when the Utah Supreme Court
denied rehearing in the Call case, or in November 1987 when
the Third Judicial District Court finally concluded that
case.

R. 285.

Covecrest filed this lawsuit within three

weeks, on November 24, 1987. Exhibit "C".

Covecrest contends

that its action was filed timely.
It would be illogical and inequitable to find that
the subdividers1 cause of action, for a refund under a void
Ordinance, accrued prior to the Court's determination that
the Ordinance was void.

As this Court has said:

To say that a cause of action accrues to a
person when she may maintain an action
thereon and, at the same time, that it
accrues before she has or can reasonably be
expected to have knowledge of any wrong
inflicted upon her is patently inconsistent
and unrealistic. She cannot maintain an
action before she knows she has one. To say
to one who has been wronged, "You had a
remedy, but before the wrong was
ascertainable to you, the law stripped you of
your remedy,11 makes a mockery of the law.
Foil v. Ballincxer, 601 P.2d 144, 148-149 (Utah 1979), quoting
from Berrv v. Branner, 245 Or. 307, 421 P.2d 996, 998 (1966).
13

Ill
IF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATION BEGAN TO RUN
PRIOR TO 1986, THEN JUSTICE AND EQUITY
REQUIRE A FINDING THAT IT WAS TOLLED, MAKING
COVECREST'S LAWSUIT TIMELY.
If the Court determines that the period of limitation
began to run prior to 1986, then justice and equity demanded
a tolling of the statute.
There are at least four separate grounds for tolling
the statute.

First, a period of limitation should be tolled,

during the appeal of a matter involving the same or similar
issue.

The purpose is to assure that claimants are not

deprived of potentially valid suits by appeals that are not
resolved until after the applicable periods of limitation
run.

See, e.g., Guthiel v. Gilmer. 27 Utah 296, 508, 76 P.

628, 632 (1904) decided under Section 2893, revised statutes
1898, a predecessor to U.C.A., Section 78-12-40; and see
Madsen v. Borthick. 769 P.2d 245, 254 (Utah, 1988).
A second reason why the Call case, 727 P.2d 180 (Utah
1986), should be considered to have tolled the running of the
limitation period, is because it was filed as a class action.
The United States Supreme Court has held that commencement of
a class action suspends the applicable statute of limitations
as to all asserted members of the class who would have been
parties, had the action been permitted to continue as a class
action.

American Pipe and Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S.

538, 38 L.Ed.2d 713, 94 S.Ct. 756 (1974).

14

The rule

pronounced by the Court is that the period of limitation is
suspended for both those who were aware, and those were
unaware, of the proceeding brought in their interest, and
even if they do not rely upon the proceedings.
551, 553-554.

Xd., 414 U.S.

The reasons for the rule are to preserve

justice, do equity, and to avoid duplicity of litigation.
Id.

When the purported class is representative of the

claims, the defendant has notice and an opportunity to gather
evidence, and the statute of limitation should not bar
recovery by the plaintiffs.

Id., p. 555.

A third reason why the statute of limitation should
be tolled, as to Covecrest Properties, is because its limited
partners have not yet reached the age of majority.

R. 271.

Utah Code Ann. §78-12-36 (1989) suspends a period of
limitation for those under the age of majority.

The

Covecrest limited partners were the same limited partners in
1978 when the impact fees were paid.

Minors are also exempt

from the notice requirements of the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act.

Scott v. School Bd. of Granite Sch. Dist., 568

P.2d 746, 748 (Utah 1977).
A fourth reason compelling a finding that the
Plaintiffs1 action was not time barred, is found in
application of the "Equitable Tolling Doctrine."
Instead, the City continued its defense of the Call
case, by arguing statutes of limitation, estoppel, unjust
enrichment, mistake and waiver.
15

Those defenses failed.

The purpose and object of statutes of limitations are
to allow a defendant to research facts pertaining to the
lawsuit while they are relatively fresh.

Collier v. City of

Pasadena, 191 Cal.Rptr. 681 (App. 1983).

They should not be

used to thwart justice or equity.
To prevent injustices caused by strict and narrow
reading of statutes of limitations, courts have applied with
increased frequency, the "Doctrine of Equitable Tolling."
The Doctrine is used to toll the statute of limitations for a
plaintiff, pending the outcome of a similar lawsuit.
Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 64 S.Ct.
582, 88 L.Ed. 788 (1944); Collier, supra.
The doctrine of "equitable tolling" is
supported by several important policy
considerations. First, it secures the
benefits of the statutes of limitation for
defendants without imposing the costs of
forfeiture on plaintiffs. (Cite omit)
Secondly, it avoids the hardship upon
plaintiffs of being compelled to pursue
simultaneously several duplicative actions on
the same set of facts. (Cite omit) Thirdly,
it lessens the costs incurred by courts and
other dispute resolution tribunals, at least
where a disposition in the case filed in one
forum may render the proceeding in the second
unnecessary or easier and cheaper to resolve.
(Cite omit)
Collier v. Citv of Pasadena, 191 Cal.Rptr. 681, 686-687 (App.
1983) .
There is a three-pronged test for invoking the
doctrine.

The elements of this test are:

(1) timely notice

to the defendant in filing the first claim; (2)

16

a lack of

prejudice to defendant in gathering evidence to defend
against the second claim; and (3)

good faith and reasonable

conduct by the plaintiff in filing the second claim.

Id.

In 1986, the Utah Supreme Court determined Ordinance
33, Section 9-C-8, to be "invalid and void ab initio" (Call,
supra, 727 P.2d at 183). That decision placed the City under
a duty to refund the impact fees that had been unlawfully
obtained.

(See El Rancho, supra, 565 P.2d at 779-780 for

duty to refund monies obtained by mistake or without
authority of law.)
The criteria for application of the Doctrine of
Equitable Tolling were satisfied by the undisputed facts and
circumstances in this action.
First, the notice requirement was satisfied because
Defendant received timely notice in November 1977, and by the
subsequent filing of the Call case as a class action.
Second, the City's ability to gather evidence was not
prejudiced, because it gathered all relevant evidence in
connection with the Call case.

R. 276-283.

The City was

placed in a position to fairly defend this action.
Defendant's own evidence, gathered in connection with Call,
and presented to the trial court, sets forth the amounts paid
by Covecrest Properties, and refers to improvements required
of Covecrest under Ordinance No. 33.

R. 276-283.

There

cannot be any other evidence that is relevant to the City
being required to refund the impact fees paid under the
17

Ordinance.

As the Court said in Call, supra, 727 P.2d 180,

183-184 (Utah 1986), "there is no possibility of inconsistent
judgments and no issue of substantial public interest
remains."
The third criteria for application of the doctrine is
good faith and reasonable conduct by the Plaintiff in filing
the second claim.

Covecrest satisfied this requirement by

filing this lawsuit within a reasonable time after this Court
nullified the Ordinance, and promptly after final disposition
of the Call case.
The Equitable Tolling Doctrine has been applied to
defenses raised under governmental immunity acts.
should not be used to thwart justice or equity.
immunity does not pertain to equitable claims.

Such acts

Governmental
El Rancho

Enterprises v. Murray City Corp.. 566 P.2d 778 (Utah 1977).
In the El Rancho case, the Utah Supreme Court stated
that common law exceptions to the Governmental Immunity Act,
pertaining to equitable claims, have been long recognized in
this jurisdiction.

Id.

Those exceptions have in no way been

eroded by the passage of time or by the enactment of the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act.

Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145,

1154 (Utah 1983).
An important rationale for invoking the Doctrine of
Equitable Tolling, to suspend a time bar, is that Congress
would not wish a plaintiff deprived of his rights when no
policy underlying a statute is served in doing so.
18

Burnett

V, N.Y. Rv. Co,, 380 U.S. 424, 434, 85 S.Ct. 1050, 1058
(1965). Furthermore, a plaintiff should not be barred by a
statute of limitations unless the defendant would be unfairly
prejudiced if the plaintiff were allowed to proceed.

See

Collier, supra at 684.
In this action, the City has not been prejudiced by
the passage of time.

There are no statutory objectives or

public policy to be served by denying the claims of the
subdividers.

IY
THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES OF MISTAKE,
ESTOPPEL, WAIVER, LACHES, AND UNJUST
ENRICHMENT ARE NOT AVAILABLE TO A
MUNICIPALITY THAT COLLECTS FEES WITHOUT
AUTHORITY. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING
THE SUBDIVIDERS1 MOTION TO STRIKE SUCH
DEFENSES.
Covecrest will not duplicate the authorities and
arguments of the other Appellant-subdividers, with respect to
why the affirmative defenses should be denied to the City.
Covecrest joins in such arguments, and has hereinabove
adapted the brief of the other subdividers.

Covecrest

contributes the following supplemental argument.
To prove laches, the City must show that (a) the
subdividers unreasonably delayed in bringing the action; and
(b) that the City was prejudiced by that delay.

Papanicolas

Brothers Enterprises v. Sugar House Shopping Center
Association. 535 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1975).
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The City had a full and timely opportunity to
investigate the facts of this case*

R. 276-283.

The City

was not prejudiced by the subdividers1 promptly filing their
action, after the Call case concluded.
No genuine issue of material fact exists with respect
to the claimed defenses.

As argued to the trial Court, the

subdividers performed discovery of the City, and found no
evidence of any factual basis to the defenses claimed by the
City.

TR. 20, R. 267-268, R. 258-260.
CONCLUSION
The notice requirement of Utah's Governmental

Immunity Act is inapplicable to the subdividers' claims.

If

notice was required, the Court should find that it was
satisfied.
The statute of limitation applicable to this lawsuit
is Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25, allowing a four-year period in
which to commence an action.

Covecrest's cause of action did

not accrue until 1986, when the Court determined the
Ordinance to be void ab initio.
If the Court determines that the period of limitation
began to run, prior to 1986, then justice and equity require
a finding that the statute was tolled.

The City made a

timely investigation of the facts, and it has not been
prejudiced.
The subdividers1 rights to a refund should not be
deemed forfeited.
20

WHEREFORE, Covecrest Properties asks the Court to
reverse the trial court's Order, Ruling and Judgment in this
matter, and to remand the case with instructions to enter
judgment in favor of the Plaintiff-Appellants for refund of
the impact fees they paid, with interest.

In addition,

Covecrest asks the Court to award costs to the Appellants,
and for such other and further relief as deemed just in the
premises.
DATED t h i s

23c/&*V

of J u l y ,

1990.

MARTIN & BIGELOW, P.C.

x==

Bel S. Martin"
Attorneys for Covecrest
Properties
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ADDENDUM
A.

STATUTES & RULES

B.

ORDER

C.

COMPLAINT AND AMENDED COMPLAINT

A. STATUTES & RULES

GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT
Validity and construction ot statute authorizing or requiring governmental unit to indemnify public officer or employee for liability
arising out of performance of public duties, 71
A L R 3d 90
Governmental tort liability for failure to provide police protection to specifically threatened
crime victim, 46 A L R 4th 948
Failure to restrain drunk driver as ground of
liability of state or local governmental unit or
officer, 48 A L R 4th 287
Liability of hospital or sanitarium for negligence of physician or surgeon, 51 A L R 4th
235

63-30-11

Municipal liability tor negligent fire lnbpection and subsequent enforcement, 69 A L R 4th
739
Applicability of libel and slander exception
to waiver of sovereign immunity under Federal
Tort Claims Act (28 USCS & 2680(h)), 79
A L R Fed 826
Applicability of 28 USCS i* 2680(a) and
2680(h) to Federal Tort Claims Act liability
arising out of government informant's conduct,
85 A L R Fed 848

63-30-10.5. Waiver of immunity for taking private property without compensationCD Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for the recovery of compensation from the governmental entity when the governmental
entity has taken or damaged private property without just compensation.
(2) Compensation and damages shall be assessed according to the requirements of Chapter 34, Title 78
History: C. 1953, 63-30-10.5, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 75, § 3.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Recent Development
in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Civil Procedure, 1989 Utah L Rev 166

63-30-11. Claim for injury — Notice — Contents — Service
— Legal disability.
(1) A claim arises when the statute of limitations that would apply if the
claim were against a private person begins to run
(2) Any person having a claim for injury against a governmental entity, or
against an employee for an act or omission occuiiing during the performance
of his duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority bhall
file a written notice of claim with the entity before maintaining an action,
regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is characterized as governmental
(3) (a) The notice of claim shall set forth.
(l) a brief statement of the factb,
(n) the nature of the claim asserted, and
(in) the damages incuired by the claimant so far as they are
known.
(b) The notice of claim shall be signed by the person making the claim
or that person's agent, attorney, parent, or legal guardian, and shall be
directed and delivered to the responsible governmental entity accoiding
to the requirements of Section 63-30-12 or 63-30-13
(4) (a) If the claimant is under the age of majority, mentally incompetent
and without a legal guardian, or imprisoned at the time the claim arises,
533

63-30-11

STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL

the claimant may apply to the court to extend the time for service of
notice of claim
(b) (i) After hearing and notice to the governmental entity, the court
may extend the time for service of notice of claim.
(ii) The court may not grant an extension that exceeds the applicable statute of limitations.
(c) In determining whether or not to grant an extension, the court shall
consider whether the delay in serving the notice of claim will substantially prejudice the governmental entity in maintaining its defense on the
merits.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 11; 1978, ch.
27, * 5; 1983, ch. 131, $ 1; 1987, ch. 75, § 4.
Amendment Note. — The 1987 amend
merit, in Subsection (2), added 'before maintaining an action, regardless of whether or not
the function giving rise to the claim is characterized as governmental" to the end of the sub-

section, added the subsection designations
within Subsections (3) and (4), in Subsection
(4)(a), added "at the time the claim arises, the
claimant may apply to the court to extend the
time for service of notice of claim", and made
minor changes in phraseology and punctuation
throughout the section

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Constitutionality
Action based on exercise of governmental function
Assignment of municipal debt
Clear statement of claims required
Conditions for right to recover
Damages not specified
Failure to file claim
Notice
Sufficiency of notice
Waiver of objections by city
Cited
Constitutionality.
Functions of the notice of claim requirement
in giving the affected governmental entity an
opportunity to promptly investigate and remedy defects immediately, in avoiding unnecessary litigation, and in minimizing difficulties
which might attend changes in administration
provide sufficient justification for its imposition as to governmental but not other tort-feasors, and therefore this section does not constitute a denial of equal protection Sears v
Southworth, 563 P 2d 192 (Utah 1977)
Action based on exercise of governmental
function.
Action against state which was predicated
on governmental supervision of financial institutions involved the exercise of a governmental function and was barred where there was
no compliance with the notice of claim provisions of §§ 63-30-11 and 63-30-12 Madsen v
Borthick, 658 P2d 627 (Utah 1983)
Assignment of municipal debt
Assignment directing city to pay debt it owes

assignor to assignee is not kind of claim required to be submitted to city in accordance
with this statute Cooper v Holder, 21 Utah 2d
40, 440 P2d 15 (1968) (decided under former
law)
Clear statement of claims required.
The purpose of this section is to require
every claimant to state clearly all of the elements of his claims to the board of commissioners or city council for allowance as a condition precedent to his right to sue the city and
recover his damages in an ordinary action
Sweet v Salt Lake City, 43 Utah 306, 134 P
1167 (1913)
Conditions for right to recover.
Statutory right to recover can be availed of
only when there has been a compliance with
the conditions upon which right is conferred
One who seeks to enforce the right must by
allegation and proof bring himself within the
conditions prescribed thereby Hamilton v Salt
Lake City, 99 Utah 362, 106 P 2d 1028 (1940)
Damages not specified.
A claim which stated the time, place and
general nature of the injury and the sidewalk
defect causing it fulfilled the purpose of former
section even though the amount of damages
was not stated, since the claim had to be filed
within thirty days of the injury, the exact
amount of damages was impossible to ascertain Spencer v Salt Lake City, 17 Utah 2d
362, 412 P 2d 449 (1966) (decided under former
law)
Failure to file claim.
Where no claim was filed as required by this
section, action to recover moneys expended to
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LIMITATION OF ACTIONS
Promises or attempts by seller to repuir
goods as tolling statute of limitations for
breach of warranty, 68 A.L.R.3d 1277.

78-12-25

Key Numbers. — Limitation of Actions *=»
24, 25

78-12-24 Actions against public officers — Within six
years.
An action by the state or any agency or public corporation thereof against
any public officer for malfeasance, misfeasance, or nonfeasance in office or
against any surety upon his official bond may be brought within six years
after such officer ceases to hold his office, but not thereafter.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-24.
Cross-References. — Governmental Immunity Act, § 63-30-1 et seq

Misconduct by public servants, §§ 76-8-201,
76-8-202.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 53 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions
§ 82 et seq.

Key Numbers. — Limitation of Actions «=»
58(2)

78-12-25. Within four years.
Within four years:
(1) an action upon a contract, obligation or liability not founded upon
an instrument in writing; also on an open account for goods, wares and
merchandise, and for any article charged in a store account; also on an
open account for work, labor or services rendered, or materials furnished;
provided, that action in all of the foregoing cases may be commenced at
any time within four years after the last charge is made or the last
payment is received.
(2) an action for relief not otherwise provided for by law.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-25.
Cross-References. — Antitrust Act actions,
§ 76-10-925

Product Liability Act, statute of limitations,
& 78-15-3

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Assigned cause of action
Breach of fiduciary duty
Damage of private property for public use.
Divorce actions
Excessive freight charges
Extension of period
Federal civil rights actions
Indemnity or guaranty bond.
Judgment lien
Land contract.
Malpractice
Mortgages
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78-12-25

JUDICIAL CODE

In action against contractors for defective
construction, the six-year limitation period of
Subsection (2) applied rather than the threeyear limitation of Subsection 78-12-26(1) because plaintiff asserted liability based entirely
on written instruments, including contracts.
Brigham Young Univ. v. Paulsen Constr. Co.,
744 P.2d 1370 (Utah 1987).
Running of statute.
—Settlement agreement.
Under a settlement agreement, the defendant was to have sold certain property and dis-

tributed the proceeds by a certain date. Therefore, a cause of action accrued when that date
passed and the defendant had not sold the
property. Butcher v. Gilroy, 744 P.2d 311
(Utah Ct. App. 1987).
Tolling.
—Concealment or misleading.
Proof of concealment or misleading by the
defendant precludes the defendant, in an action under a settlement agreement, from raising the statute of limitations defense. Butcher
v. Gilroy, 744 P.2d 311 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Limitations of actions applicable
to action by trustees of employee benefit plan
to enforce delinquent employer contributions

under ERISA (29 USCS § 1132(a)), 90 A.L.R.
Fed. 374.

78-12-25. Within four years.
Within four years:
(1) An action upon a contract, obligation, or liability not founded upon
an instrument in writing; also on an open account for goods, wares, and
merchandise, and for any article charged on a store account; also on an
open account for work, labor or services rendered, or materials furnished;
provided, that action in all of the foregoing cases may be commenced at
any time within four years after the last charge is made or the last
payment is received.
(2) A claim for relief or a cause of action under the following sections of
Chapter 6, Title 25, the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act:
(a) Subsection 25-6-5(l)(a), which in specific situations limits the
time for action to one year, under Section 25-6-10;
(b) Subsection 25-6-5(l)(b); or
(c) Subsection 25-6-6(1).
(3) An action for relief not otherwise provided for by law.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, $ 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-25; L. 1988, ch. 59, 5 14.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment, effective April 25, 1988, inserted Subsec-

tion (2); redesignated former Subsection (2) as
Subsection (3); and made minor stylistic
changes in Subsection (1).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Conflict of laws.
Constitutionality.
Federal civil rights actions.
Malpractice.
Open account.
Other claims for relief.
—Federal claim.
Cited.
Conflict of laws.
Trial court properly extended comity so as to

apply the two-year limitations provision of the
California Governmental Claims Act, rather
than this section, to a complaint alleging injury sustained in an emergency landing of a
helicopter owned by a California governmental
entity. Jackett v. Los Angeles Dep't of Water &
Power, 771 P.2d 1074 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Constitutionality.
Subsection (3) does not violate the open
courts provision of the Utah constitution.
McHenry v. Utah Valley Hosp., 724 F. Supp.
835 (D. Utah 1989).

114

78-12-36

JUDICIAL CODE

—Defendant's family.
The full time that the debtor is out of the
state must be excluded in computing the time,
notwithstanding fact that debtor's family mav
have residence or place of abode in state and
that service of process could be made upon
some member of debtor's family at its residence

or place of abode Keith-O'Brien Co v Snyder,
51 Utah 227, 169 P 954 (1917)
—Statute tolled.
Maintenance of residence within state with
persons living therein did not prevent tolling of
statute of limitations Buell v Duchesne Mercantile Co, 64 Utah 391, 231 P 123 (1924)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Brigham Young Law Review. — Reasonable Assurance of Actual Notice Required for
In Personam Default Judgment in Utah Graham v Sawaya, 1981 B Y U L Rev 937, 945
Am. Jur. 2d. — 51 Am Jur 2d Limitation
of Actions § 154 et seq
C.J.S. — 54 C J S Limitations of Actions
§ 211

A.L.R. — Tolling of statute of limitations
during absence from state as affected by fact
that party claiming benefit of limitations remained subject to service during absence or
nonresidence, 55 A L R 3d 1158
Key Numbers. — Limitation of Actions «=>
84, 85

78-12-36. Effect of disability.
If a person entitled to bring an action, other than for the recovery of real
property, is at the time the cause of action accrued, either under the age of
majority or mentally incompetent and without a legal guardian, the time of
the disability is not a part of the time limited for the commencement of the
action.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-1236; L. 1975, ch. 67, § 16; 1987,
ch. 19, § 5.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment deleted the subsection references in this
section as set out in the bound volume, and
deleted "imprisoned on a criminal charge, or in
execution under the sentence of a criminal
court, for a term less than for life" following
"without a legal guardian" and made minor
changes in phraseology and punctuation
throughout the section
Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1987, ch 19, § 6
provides that the amendment to this section
applies only to causes of action that arise after

April 27, 1987 and has no retroactive application
Cross-References. — Actions to recover
real property, effect of disability, § 78-12-21
Age of majority, § 15-2-1
Disaffirmance of contract by minor,
S§ 15-2-2, 15-2-3
Guardians
of
incapacitated
persons,
§ 75 5-301 et seq
Medical malpractice actions, limitations provisions applicable regardless of disability,
§ 78-14-4
Product Liability Act, limitations provisions
applicable regardless of disability, § 78-15-3

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Notice of claim requirements
—Failure to file
Action barred
Action not barred
Paternity action
—Minority
Wrongful death
—Minority
Cited
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Rule 56

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Brigham Young Law Review. — Reusonable Abburante of Actual Notice Required for
In Perbonam Default Judgment in Utah Graham v Sawaya, 1981 B Y U L Rev 937
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am Jur 2d Judgments

Opening default or default judgment claimed
to have been obtained becaube of attorney's
mistake as to time or place of appearance,
t r l a l > o r f l l m g o f n e c e S sary papers, 21 A L R 3d
^55

§§

F lXur
* ? to g f l v e K n o t l c e f a P P h c a t l o n f d f
ault
f
J ^ * ™ ^ "* e ™ «J° }"» 0 Ib r e q U i r e d ° n l y
bv
custom, 28 A L R 3d 1383
Failure of party or his attorney to appear at
pretrial conference, 55 A L R 3d 303
Default judgments against the United States
under Rule 55(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 55 A L R Fed 190
Key Numbers. — Judgment <*=» 92 to 134

C . i l - 41921CJ S Judgments §§ 187 to 218
A.L.R. - Necessity of taking proof as to habihty against defaulting defendant, 8 A L R 3d
1070
Appealability of order setting aside, or refusmg to set aside, default judgment, 8 A L R 3d
1272
Defaulting defendant's right to notice and
hearing as to determination of amount of damages, 15 A L R 3d 586

f

Rule 56. Summary judgment.
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any
part thereof
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time,
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his
favor as to all or any part thereof
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing The adverse party prior to the
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits The judgment bought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to mtei rogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law A summary judgment, interlocutory in
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a
genuine issue as to the amount of damages
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted It
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or
othei lehef lb not in controversy, and dnecting such fuither pioceedings in the
action as are just Upon the trial of the action the factb so specified shall be
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirma161

Rule 56

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

tively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories,
or further affidavits When a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him
(0 When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such
other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 56, F R C P

Cross-References. — Contempt generally,
§§ 78-7-18, 78-32-1 et seq

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Affidavit
—Contents
—Corporation
—Inconsistency with deposition
—Necessity of opposing affidavits
Resting on pleadings
—Sufficiency
Hearsay and opinion testimony
—Superseding pleadings
—Unpleaded defenses
—Verified pleading
—Waiver of right to contest
—When unavailable
—Who may make
Affirmative defense
Answers to interrogatories
Appeal
—-Standard of review
Attorney's fees
Availability of motion
Cross-motions
Damages
Disputed facts
Discovery
Evidence
—Facts considered

—Improper evidence
—Proof
—Weight of testimony
Improper party plaintiff
Issue of fact
—Corporate existence
—Deeds
—Lease as security
Judicial attitude
Motion for new trial
Motion to dismiss
Motion to reconsider
Notice
—Pro\ision not jurisdictional
—Waiver of defect
Procedural due process
Purpose
Summary judgment improper
—Damage to insured vehicle
—Dispersal of interest
—Findings by court
—Foreclosure of trust deeds
—Fraud or duress
—Guardianship
—Mortgage note.
—Negligence
—Nonspecific denial of requests for admission
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STEPHEN G HOMER
(1536)
West Jordan City Attorney
P 0 Box 428
West Jordan, Utah 84084
Telephone 561-1463
Attorney for Defendant
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

AMERICAN TIERRA CORPORATION et a l ,

]
)
]
)
]I
)
I
])

Plaintiffs
vs
THE CITY OF WEST JORDAN, UTAH,

)

Defendant

ORDER, RULING AND JUDGMENT
Civil
Civil
Civil
Civil
Civil

No.
No.
No.
No.
No.

C
C
C
C
C

87-7679
87-7680
87-7681
87-7682
88-4700

[Cases assigned to Judge Pat Brian]

The C o u r t , h a v i n g read the Memoranda o f Law submitted by Counsel and on
February 2 1 , 1990, having heard o r a l argument on t h e m a t t e r
apprised

of

the

issues,

now e n t e r s

the

following

and b e i n g

Findings

of

fully

Fact

and

Conclusions o f Law:
1.

The i n d i v i d u a l P l a i n t i f f s f a i l e d t o f i l e a " n o t i c e of c l a i m " w i t h i n 90

days a f t e r t h e i r causes of action arose.
2.

The i n d i v i d u a l P l a i n t i f f s

f a i l e d to f i l e t h e i r l i t i g a t i o n w i t h i n the

one year " s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n " period a f t e r t h e i r cause of a c t i o n arose.
3.

The d o c t r i n e o f " e q u i t a b l e t o l l i n g " has n o t been adopted by t h e

State

o f Utah,
Based upon t h e

foregoing

Findings

of

F a c t and C o n c l u s i o n s o f Law, IT IS

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

D e f e n d a n t ' s M o t i o n f o r P a r t i a l Summary Judgment i s g r a n t e d . The c l a i m s

of the i n d i v i d u a l P l a i n t i f f s

are b a r r e d by (1) s t a t u t e s

of

limitation

and

(2)

t h e f a i l u r e o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l P l a i n t i f f s t o comply w i t h t h e " n o t i c e o f c l a i m "
statutes.
2.

Plaintiffs'

Cross-Motion

f o r Summary Judgment t o s t r i k e Defendant's

a f f i r m a t i v e defenses i s denied.
3.

Plaintiffs'

C r o s s - M o t i o n f o r Summary Judgment t o s t r i k e Defendant's

" s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s " defenses i s denied.
4.

Counsel f o r t h e Defendant

i s d i r e c t e d t o prepare the appropriate

w r i t t e n order r e f l e c t i n g t h i s r u l i n g and judgment and submit t h e same t o t h e
Court not l a t e r than March 2 , 1990.
The C l e r k o f t h e Court i s d i r e c t e d t o s t r i k e from the t r i a l calendar the
three-day j u r y t r i a l i n t h i s case, scheduled t o begin on March 2 6 t h .
Entered t h i s

ff

day o f March, 1990.
BY THE COURT:~}

aJ- 1
PAT B BRIAN
Judge o f the D i s t r i c t

Court

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

GORDON K JENSEN, Attorney f o r P l a i n t i f f

MEL S MARTIN, Attorney f o r P l a i n t i f f
CERTIFICATE
I c e r t i f y t h a t I caused t o be t r a n s m i t t e d by telephonic f a c s i m i l e machine a copy
o f t h e f o r e g o i n g ORDER, RULING AND JUDGMENT t o Mr Gordon K Jensen, 4252 South
700 East, Murray, Utah 84107, and t o Mr Mel S M a r t i n , 900 Kennecott B u i l d i n g ,
10 East South Temple S t r e e t ,
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84133, t h i s 1st day o f
March, 1990.
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C.

COMPLAINT AND AMENDED COMPLAINT

feni
i^
ROBERT J. DEBRY - A004 9
. „,. - ,
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES I *._!_*
Attorneys for Plaintiff
4001 South 700 East, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah
84107
Telephone: (801) 262-8915
c^>" pCt/

-n
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

VA2
COVE CREST PROPERTIES,
a Utah Ltd. Partnership,
Plaintiff,

COMPLAINT AND
JURY DEMAND

vs.

Civil No. CL^n-^lU^O

CITY OF WEST JORDAN,
Defendant.

Plaintiff complains of defendant as follows:
1.

Plaintiff is a subdivider and developer.

2.

Plaintiff developed a subdivision in the City

of West Jordan by the name of Vista Via Subdivision I, 11
and III.
3.

In

August

of

1978,

defendant

required

plaintiff to pay the sum of $18,884.22, pursuant to City
Ordinance 33, Section 9-C-8(a).
4.

The said ordinance was inval Id in that no

public hearing was held as required by §10-9-25, Utah Code
Ann.
5.

Defendant had no statutory authority to exact

said fee from plaintiff.

WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays

for a refund of the

said $18,884,22 plus interest.
DATED this ,£A

day of

/^ ) frtMJndui, 1987.

ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiff
/

/
/

By:

Plaintiff resides at:
3495 South 3610 East
Salt Lake City, Utah

84109

/ ^ 4 c / /

\y

Kay M. Lewis Bar No. (1944)
Mel S. Martin Bar No. (2102)
JENSEN & LEWIS, P.C.
Attorney for Plaintiff
320 South 300 East, Suite 1
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 328-4981
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
COVECREST PROPERTIES, a
Utah Limited Partnership,

)
)

Plaintiff,

)
)
)

AMENDED COMPLAINT
AND JURY DEMAND

)

Civil No. C87-7680

)

Judge David S. Young

vs.
CITY OF WEST JORDAN
Defendant.

Plaintiff Complains of Defendant as follows:
1.

Plaintiff is a Utah Limited Partnership and is a

subdivider and developer.
2.

Plaintiff developed three contiguous subdivisions

in the City of West Jordan by the names of Vista Via Subdivision
I, II, and III.
3.

In August of 1978, Defendant required Plaintiff to

pay the sum of $18,884.22, pursuant to city ordinance 33, Section
9-C-8(a).
4.

The said ordinance was invalid in that no public

was held as required by Subsection 10-9-25, Utah Code Ann,
5.

Defendant had no statutory authority to exact said

fee from Plaintiff.

-26.

Plaintiff requests a jury trial in connection with

this matter and has previously filed its jury fee in connection
herewith.
7.

Tendered herewith is Plaintiff's cash bond, in the

amount of $300.00, for deposit and retention by the clerk, during
the pendency of this matter.

Said bond is proffered in

compliance with U.C.A. Section 63-30-19, which requires an
undertaking, "conditioned upon payment by the plaintiff of
taxable costs incurred by the governmental entity
in the action if the plaintiff fails to prosecute the action or
fails to recover judgment."

Plaintiff asks that the money be

deposited in an interest bearing account, so that it can be
returned with interest, in the event that the Court does not
direct otherwise.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for a judgment against the
Defendant and a refund of said $18,884.22 plus interest.

DATED this

4 ^

day of MAXCt/ , 1988.
JENSEN & LEWIS, P.C.

KAY M. LEWIS
MEL S. MARTIN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Plaintiff's address:
3495 South 3610 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109

